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한겨레에서 진행한 서면 인터뷰입니다. 

월러스틴과 같은 정치경제학자도 자본주의의 대안에 대해서 새로운 형태의 삶을 이야기 합니다. 즉, 물질적인 동기에 의해 움직이는 것이 아니라, 평판과 자기만족에 의해 움직이는 체제입니다. 

한글 번역

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/book/673081.html

아래는 영문버전

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/674079.html

Immanual Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar, Yale University 

Does capitalism have a future? Today’s capitalist system is facing such serious issues that the word “crisis” has become part of the everyday conversation, while discussions on alternatives have become tinged with despair. Last year saw the publication in Korean translation of a book that asks this very question: Immanual Wallerstein’s “Does Capitalism Have a Future?,” co-written with Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derluguian, and Craig Calhoun (translated by Seong Baek-yong for Changbi Publishing). The release was accompanied by a conversation exchanged in letters between main author Wallerstein, a Yale University emeritus professor and analyst of global systems, and Lee Kang-kook, an economics professor at Japan’s Ritsumeikan University. 

In the conversation, Wallerstein said the recent crisis of capitalism is beyond solving through the Keynesian approach of increasing state intervention. While Thomas Piketty, whose “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” has drawn global notice, contributed to the public debate on worsening inequality under the current global system, Wallerstein also noted that he suffers from the same limitations as other mainstream economists. According to Wallerstein, US hegemony is in a state of catastrophic collapse, and while its place could be taken by China and Northeast Asia, the growth of the middle-class of Chinese consumers is poised to strain the world economy and exacerbate the crisis. As an alternative, he suggested more environmentally-friendly pattern of living based in community closeness and social solidarity.

As South Korea loses its economic vitality, its future hinges on integration with the rest of Northeast Asia, Wallerstein said. He noted that the country could play a pivotal role in that process, but added that doing so would first require improving relations with North Korea and creating a system of inter-Korean integration. 　

The Global Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath 

Lee Kang-kook, professor at Japan’s Ritsumeikan University. 

Lee Kang-kook: First, I like to know about the reason and motivation why you and your co-authors planned to write this book. Why should we pose this fundamental question about capitalism now? We will ask you about the end of capitalism later in more detail.

Immanuel Wallerstein: We all believe that the world-system is in enormous difficulty and that the general discussion lacks historical depth as well as weak theorizing. We hope to stimulate a more useful debate about the world’s alternatives.

Lee: After the global financial crisis, the world economy has been in serious recession for long, much longer than economists expected. How do you evaluate the current state of the global economy, and especially responses of the advanced country governments such as quantitative easing policy? Following the crisis, Keynesians appear to have returned and become more powerful. They argue that the crisis was a failure of unregulated capitalism and the state can and should manage the capitalist economy rather successfully. I think that you must be very critical of this view.

Wallerstein: This is one of the things upon which the five authors do not agree. Two of us seem to argue that a Keynesian approach might work. Two others, including me, think the situation is way beyond that point. Even those who are sympathetic to a Keynesian approach argue that this is not enough.

Lee: Then, what do you think are fundamental causes and implications of the global financial crisis, and how is your view different from other positions, including lefitsts? I think that this crisis could be the specific crisis of financialization in the B phase of Kondratiev cycle from your perspective. But I am not so sure whether it is really a part of the structural crisis once in 500 years, as you emphasize.

Wallerstein: The major difference between my own view and that of many, probably most, leftists is that most leftists emphasize the strength of popular resistance to a worsening situation. I don’t deny this, but for me popular resistance is a long-time constant. What has been added now is the fact that capitalist accumulation via market processes no longer works for capitalists. Therefore, capitalists as well as the vulnerable classes are looking for alternatives to capitalism in order to ensure their wealth.

Lee: It is interesting that even in mainstream economics there are now concerns about a gloomy future of capitalism. For instance, Larry Summers mentioned ‘secular recession’ and Robert Gordon argues that growth rate will become lower in the long-run mainly due to stagnation in innovation. Could you make some comments on these arguments from your point of view?

Wallerstein: What you will notice in such mainstream gloom is that there always is an escape clause. They are saying: All is gloomy, unless you do x or y. I don’t think there is such an x or y.

Lee: Now, inequality in capitalism is a hot issue in economics. Thomas Piketty recently presented dynamics of inequality in capitalism in “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”, which became a bestseller. He calls for higher progressive income tax and global capital tax in order to reform capitalism. He predicts that the 21st century will become worse without any efforts since the return on capital tends to be higher than the growth rate. It brought about a serious debate among economists. How do you evaluate Piketty’s work and the related debate? What do you think of the dynamics of inequality in the history of capitalism?

Wallerstein: Piketty is basically an intelligent and very technically competent mainstream economist who favors a social-democratic solution to the situation. He suffers therefore from the same limitations of other mainstream economists. That said, his book has had the virtue of reinforcing a public debate about growing inequality in the world-system. And that is a good thing. 

Capitalism and Prospects for Transition 

Immanual Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar, Yale University 

Lee: You have argued that the fundamental cause of the end of the current system is a continuous rise of cost in production, including labor, input/infrastructure, and tax for several hundred years. I think your explanation is somewhat different from an original Marxist argument about the falling rate of profit rate due to the rise of organic composition of capital. Anyways, one may argue that the trend of rising costs is not so clear in reality. For example, at least wage has been stagnant after the 1980s in comparison with labor productivity growth, which resulted in a fall of the labor share. What do you think?

Wallerstein: The costs of production have always risen in a pattern of two steps upward, one step downward. You are noticing the one step downward, and ignoring the two steps upward. This pattern over 500 years has brought the costs to such a high level that they are approaching an asymptote and are too near the possible maximum price rate for their products. Hence, the system oscillates and is in chaotic wild swings.

Lee: In many works including this book, you have argued that the hegemony of the US under neoliberalism has been in decline. But the US has still great influence on other countries by military measures, enhancement of alliance, economic measures and others. What do you think of the future of the US hegemony? If it is true that the hegemony of the US is weakening in terms of the economic power and other countries are rising, does this change in hegemony necessarily aggravate the collapse of capitalism? One may think that continuous growth in other emerging market countries, higher than in the US, means that it is not the end but rearrangement of capitalism.

Wallerstein: US hegemony is not declining - it in catastrophic collapse. This ends its useful role as maintaining both the role of the U.S. in the system and its role as guarantor of the stability of the system as a whole. If the world-system were not in structural crisis, then yes other countries (such as a Northeast Asia bloc) might succeed to its role. This would take some time, and long before that happened, we would be out of the capitalist system.

Lee: What about rising China? Giovanni Arrighi thought of the Chinese system rather positively. In this book, Craig Calhoon also says that “Chinese-style state capitalism may be even more likely” as a future form of capitalism in this book. What do you think of China’s current growth and the possibility that the Chinese style state capitalism could become dominant?

Wallerstein: China’s growth in the last twenty years or so has been spectacular. But it is slowing already. And China may soon find itself in the same dilemmas as a state as most of the rest of the world. In addition, the numerically large increase of middle-class consumers in China is putting additional strain on the world-economy. It actually makes the crisis worse.

Lee: You say that there are two opposite possibilities after this structural crisis including Davos spirit and Porto Alegre spirit, both of which are also split into two camps. In fact, I happened to put the term ‘Davos and Porto Allegre’ in the title of my book to criticize globalization long ago. But I think there is still huge imbalance in power between these two and the conservative Davos group is the most powerful. Is there any possibility that a relatively reformist camp of Davos and a part of Porto Allegre may make coalition to reform capitalism?

Wallerstein: Yes this is a possible political coalition. I would call that a co-option by the reformist Davos group of the so-called reformist Porto Alegre group. The result would not be capitalism but a newkind of world-system that maintained the worst features of capitalism: hierarchy, exploitation, and polarization. This would not be a good outcome, but it is a possible one.

Lee: You have always emphasized that future is open and the world can change good or bad with 50/50, and progressive political efforts are essential. However, it is not easy to think of important groups to push forward these changes in the global level. Exactly who do you think are a camp of Porto Allegre calling for the more democratic and egalitarian system? Tell us more about future prospects for political struggles and new forms of political movement.

Wallerstein: You are right. But the strength of the world left is from the bottom up and not the top down. So one doesn‘t see “important groups.” One sees an array across of the world of multiple efforts, many of them quite local, learning from each other and beginning to support each other. This may not be enough, but there is no better left alternative. 

Korea and other questions 

Lee: Korea is a rare case in the world-system in that it moved from periphery to semi-periphery, and finally moving to center. There is a debate about the Korean experience, between the mainstream view to emphasize the market and the heterodox argument to underscore the role of the developmental state. However, after the 1997 financial crisis, our economy appears to have lost economic dynamism, due to neoliberal restructuring and opening, and many are worried about long-run decline like Japan, pointing to the low birth rate and high household debt problem. From the world-systems theory perspective, how do you analyze the economic success of Korea in the past and future prospects?

Wallerstein: Korea’s rise was the result of state developmentalist policies in the context of Korea having a geopolitically crucial geographical location. Today, Korea has perhaps lost, as you say, some economic dynamism. Korea’s future is linked to the creation of a more integrated Northeast Asian structure. This is politically difficult but not at all impossible.

Lee: Regarding Northeast Asia, I remember once you presented a possibility that China, Japan and Korea may cooperate in creating a sort of regional block in the future. However, what is going on in reality is different, with deepening conflicts among these countries. What do you think of the future of this region, and the strategic position of Korea?

Wallerstein: Korea’s first and most difficult political problem is how to come to terms with the DPRK, and arrive at some sort of unified structure. If that occurs, Korea can play a key role in bringing about a political and economic deal between China and Japan. In short, I think Korea is the key player, despite being the smallest power.

Lee: Soon, it will be 2015. Could you tell us your prospects about the new year about the global economy and international geopolitics?

Great uncertainty and continuing fluctuations 

Does Capitalism Have a Future?

Lee: Still many are wondering about what could be the alternative to capitalism. What is ‘the alternative organization of markets’ in detail, which co-authors present in the collective conclusion in this book? In this book, Randall Collins says the future of capitalism is “a noncapitalist system, which means socialist ownership and strong central regulation and planning.” Do you agree with him, or what kind of a concrete system do you have in your mind? Given the reality that conservatives-capitalists are powerful, we think that it is necessary to discuss a more specific action plan of anti-capitalists, especially, including methodology of economic management.

Wallerstein: As a general proposition, I don’t think one can predict in advance what kind of new structures will be created. I often say that, if in the late fifteenth century, a group of scholars were discussing what would replace the collapsing feudal system in Europe, who among them could possibly have predicted the way capitalist structures would look and function in the twentieth century. So I think Randall Collins is a bit rash in his prediction.

Lee: I understand your point very well. However, if we do not have any alternative principle against capitalism, it may be hard for us to mobilize political movement against capitalism. In that regard, I think that there must be positive feedback between progressive social science and progressive political movement. That is why we are wondering about a concrete form or example of possible alternative systems, especially from the perspective of economists.

Wallerstein: We shall have to experiment with forms of reward that are not material but prestige and self-satisfaction with performance. We have long had such forms in education and health structures, although in the last fifty years they have been commodified. But they did work for hundreds of years, if not thousands. You keep talking about mobilizing people against capitalism. Capitalism is doomed whether or not we mobilize people against it. The issue is not that, but mobilizing people around a civilizational change in which we all give priority to what is called in Latin America buen vivir or good living. This is not easy. But all of us, and especially economists, have to think in terms of willingness to experiment with new forms of reward.

Lee: Randall Collins’ anticipation that the middle class will disappear due to technology is indeed shocking. Many people may agree that innovation in technology may cause the mass unemployment. But Collins’ saying “50% of the working population, or 70%” seems to be not conceivable. Do you think that the world economy cannot prevent such mass unemployment? Actually a lot of new jobs had been created along with economic growth and technological development in history of capitalism as Michael Mann writes. We like to know your opinion about the effect of technology and its implication to the economic system in the future.

Wallerstein: Mann is right about the past. But here I agree entirely with Randall Collins about why we can no longer prevent mass unemployment. Technology is a dependent variable, not an efficient cause.

Lee: Michael Mann argues that even though we maintain the system of capitalism, we would meet another crisis of global warming. He seriously worries about it for the ecological crisis would be a threat to the whole world. One may think that we should politically deal with the ecological crisis as Mann argues. What do you think of political solution to the ecological crisis? Or how can we overcome it in the process of transition? Can socialism resolve the environmental crisis better?

Wallerstein: I agree with Mann that ecological disaster is a matter of grave concern. However, I am less sure than Mann as to when the crucial turning-point will come. It may come after the transition to a new world-system. And therefore, should the spirit of Porto Alegre prevail, something effective may be done about it. Within the present system, I do not believe anything effective can or will be done.

Lee: What do you think of the role and attitude of social science in this transition period? Many argue that neoclassical economics is in crisis as you also compare it with astrology in the past. I think that economics should get over its narrow-minded limitation and communicate with other social sciences. For long, you have suggested an integration of several areas of academics and put it into practice as you introduced Prigogine’s theory in your analysis. I think that it is same vein that authors in this book call themselves “methodological pluralists” in collective conclusion. In Korea, the academics of social science are still divided deeply. Do you have any advices to social scientists, especially in Korea?

Wallerstein: Social scientists in Korea are in the same situation as academics in the rest of the world. I think they, as we, must face up to the epistemological issues, work for a reunification of the domains of knowledge, and use these insights to make our moral choices and our political decisions.

Interview by Lee Kang-kook, an economics professor at Japan’s Ritsumeikan University

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

The U.S. Election: It’s over at last, or is it?

Almost everyone is astonished at Trump’s victory. It is said that even Trump was astonished. And of course now everyone is explaining how it happened, although the explanations are different. And everyone is talking about the deep cleavages that the election created (or it reflected?) in the U.S. body politic.

I am not going to add one more such analysis to the long list I’m already tired of reading them. I just want to concentrate on two issues: What are the consequences of this victory of Trump (1) for the United States, and (2) for U.S. power in the rest of the world.

Internally, the results, no matter how you measure them, move the United States significantly to the right. It doesn’t matter that Trump actually lost the national popular vote. And it doesn’t matter that if a mere 70,000 votes in three states (something under 0.09% of the total vote cast) had been lacking to Trump, Hillary Clinton would have won.

What does matter is that the Republicans have gained what is called the trifecta – control of the Presidency, both Houses of Congress, and the Supreme Court. And while the Democrats might win back the Senate and even the Presidency in four or eight years, the Republicans will hold on to a Supreme Court majority for a very much longer time.

To be sure, the Republicans are divided on some important issues. This is apparent just one week after the elections. Trump has already begun to display his pragmatic side and therefore his priorities: more jobs, tax reduction (but certain kinds), and saving parts of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) that are widely popular. The Republican Establishment (a quite far right Establishment) has other priorities: destroying Medicaid and even Medicare, different kinds of tax reform, and rolling back social liberalism (such as abortion rights and gay marriage).

It remains to be seen if Trump can win against Paul Ryan (who is the key figure in the Congress-based rightwing), or Paul Ryan can push back Trump. The key figure in this struggle seems to be Vice-President Mike Pence, who has positioned himself remarkably as the real number two in the Presidential office (as had Dick Cheney).

Pence knows Congress well, is ideologically close to Paul Ryan, but politically loyal to Trump. It was he that chose Reince Priebus as Chief of Staff for Trump, preferring him to Steve Bannon. Priebus stands for uniting the Republicans, while Bannon stands for attacking Republicans who are less than 100% loyalists to an ultra-rightwing message. While Bannon got a consolation prize as an inside counselor, it is doubtful that he will have any real power.

However this intra-Republican struggle turns out, it is still the case that U.S. politics are now significantly further to the right. Perhaps the Democratic Party will reorganize as a more leftwing, more populist movement, and be able to contest the Republicans in future elections. That too remains to be seen. But Trump’s electoral victory is a reality and an achievement.

Let us now turn from the internal arena in which Trump has won and has real power to the external arena (the rest of the world) in which he has virtually none. He used the campaign slogan “make America great again.” What he said time and time again was that, if he were president, he would ensure that other countries respected (that is, obeyed) the United States. In effect, he alluded to a past in which the United States was “great” and said that he would recover that past.

The problem is very simple. Neither he nor any other president – be it Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama or for that matter Ronald Reagan – can do very much about the advanced decline of the erstwhile hegemonic power. Yes, the United States once ruled the roost, more or less between 1945 and circa 1970. But ever since then, it has been steadily declining in its ability to get other countries to follow its lead and to do what the United States wanted.

The decline is structural and not something within the power of an American president to stem. Of course, the United States remains an incredibly powerful military force. If it misuses this military power, it can do much damage to the world. Obama was very sensitive to this potential harm, which accounts for all his hesitancies. And Trump was accused throughout the electoral campaign of not understanding this and therefore being a dangerous wielder of U.S. military power.

But while doing harm is quite possible, doing what the U.S. government might define as good seems virtually beyond the power of the United States. No one, and I mean no one, will follow today the lead of the United States if it thinks its own interests are being ignored. This is true not only of China, Russia, Iran, and of course North Korea. It is true as well of Japan and South Korea, India and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, France and Germany, Poland and the Baltic states, and our erstwhile special allies like Israel, Great Britain, and Canada.

I am fairly sure that Trump does not yet realize this. He will boast about the easy victories, like ending trade pacts. He will use this to prove the wisdom of his aggressive stance. But let him try to do something about Syria – anything – and he will soon be disabused of his power. He is most unlikely to retreat on the new relationship with Cuba. And he may come to realize that he should not undo the Iran agreement. As for China, the Chinese seem to think that they can make better arrangements with Trump than they would have been able to do with Clinton.

So, a more rightwing United States in a more chaotic world-system, with protectionism the major theme of most countries and an economic squeeze on the majority of the world’s population. And is it over? By no means, neither in the United States, nor in the world-system. It’s a continuing struggle about the direction in which the future world-system (or systems) should and will be heading.

Brexit 사태를 맞이해서 오래간만에 찾아본 Wallestine 옹의 글입니다. '그렇군' 님이 블로그에서 지적한 바와 같이 영국의 EU탈퇴를 미국의 패권 몰락 측면에서 바라보는 입장이 참 재미있네요. 

http://iwallerstein.com/brexit-symptom-not-cause-of-turmoil/

On June 23, the referendum on a British withdrawal from the European Union (EU) won by a clear margin. Politicians and pundits have treated this as an unprecedented and earth-shaking decision. They have been giving various and quite contradictory explanations about the causes of this event and the consequences of this event for Great Britain and the rest of the world.

The first thing to note is that no legal decision to exit the EU has yet been taken. The referendum was, in legal terms, merely advisory. In order to withdraw from the EU, the British government must formally inform the EU that it is invoking Article 50 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which is what provides the right and the mode of withdrawal. No one has ever invoked Article 50, so yes, it would be unprecedented. No one therefore can be sure how it would work in practice. While it seems most unlikely that any British government would ignore the referendum, strangely there has been no major British politician who seemed in a hurry to invoke Article 50, an action that would be irreversible.

Prime Minister David Cameron, who campaigned against Brexit, has said it will not be he who invokes Article 50. Rather, he has announced his resignation as Prime Minister – however not immediately but when the Conservative Party chooses a new leader. Cameron believes this person should be the one who invokes Article 50. This seems on the surface to be sensible. Once Article 50 is invoked, there will be many issues about Great Britain’s future relations with the EU and with other countries that will have to be decided and it might be best that these decisions be made by his successor.

The first question therefore is who will be his successor and when will this person be chosen. There is considerable pressure from other countries in the EU that this succession be done as soon as possible. In response to this pressure, the Conservative Party has set the date as September 2. There were until June 29 two main candidates: Boris Johnson, a leading advocate of Brexit but not yet a member of parliament; and Theresa May, who opposed Brexit but who shares some part of the objectives of the supporters of Brexit. It is stunning to learn that Johnson actually expected to lose the vote and therefore did not prepare a political map for what he should do after the referendum.

It seemed that Johnson wanted to “negotiate” Britain’s withdrawal. Article 50 provides a two-year period for working out post-withdrawal arrangements. This seems to allow for such negotiations. It also says that, if no agreement is reached, the cutting of all ties is automatic. What Johnson apparently wanted was a deal in which Great Britain retained the advantages of a common market but would no longer be bound by the EU’s constraints on immigration and human rights. The other countries in the EU have been showing no sympathy for such an arrangement. As Germany’s quite conservative Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said, they feel that “in is in and out is out.” Since “out” will have immediate negative consequences on the economic situation for most persons in Great Britain, and especially many of the supporters of Brexit, Johnson and others have been dragging their feet about invoking Article 50. This is probably what underlay Michael Gove’s last-minute decision to cease being Johnson’s campaign manager and to announce his own candidacy, backed immediately by most strong Brexit supporters. Gove, it seems, will not hesitate. Johnson has withdrawn his candidacy and is possibly quite relieved not to be the one who gets the blame for invoking Article 50.

What are the matters underlying this debate? There are essentially four: popular anger at the so-called Establishment and its parties; the geopolitical decline of the United States; the politics of austerity; and identity politics. All of them have contributed to the turmoil. But all of them have a long history that predates by far the Brexit referendum. The priorities among these four are different for the multiple actors, including the British who voted to leave Europe.

There is little doubt that popular anti-Establishment anger is a strong force. It has often erupted when economic conditions are uncertain, as they surely are today. If this seems a stronger motivation now than previously, it is probably because economic uncertainty is far greater than in the past.

Still it should be noted that anti-Establishment movements have not won out everywhere or consistently. The movements sometimes win out, and just as often do not. For successes, one can point to Brexit, Trump’s rise to being the de facto Republican presidential candidate in the United States, Syriza‘s becoming the governing party in Greece, and Rodrigo Duterte’s election as President of the Philippines. On the other hand, see the recent electoral defeat of Podemos in Spain or the signs of some voter remorse already in Great Britain. The life span of such movements seems to be relatively short. So, even if stronger today than in the past, it is not at all sure that such movements are the wave of the future.

The geopolitical consequences of Brexit are probably more important. Great Britain’s withdrawal from Europe deals a further blow to the ability of the United States to maintain its dominance in the world-system. Great Britain has been in many ways the indispensable geopolitical ally (or is it agent?) of the United States in Europe, in NATO, in the Middle East, and vis-à-vis Russia. There is no substitute. That is why President Obama strongly and publicly supported the Remain vote in Great Britain and, after the referendum, has sought to persuade Great Britain to remain a close ally. That is why Henry Kissinger, in an op-ed in The Wall Street Journalof June 28, called for the United States to seek “to transform setback (the Brexit turmoil) into opportunity.” How? By reinforcing the “special relationship” with Great Britain and for the United States to redefine its role in “a new kind of leadership, moving from dominance to persuasion.” Kissinger is clearly worried. It sounds like whistling in the dark to me.

Austerity is obviously nobody’s desired policy, except for the ultra-rich who alone profit from it. The fear of increased austerity, as promised by the British government, surely contributed significantly to the move for Brexit, which was promoted as a way to reduce austerity and secure a better future for the vast majority of the population. Austerity is another theme that today is worldwide – both as practice and as cause for fear and anger. There is nothing special about the British situation in this regard. Modal income has been going down there for a quarter-century at least, as it has been everywhere.

The economic turmoil and the fears it provokes have resulted in the prominence of identity politics – Britain for the British (actually for the English), Russia for the Russians, South Africa for the South Africans, and of course Donald Trump’s America for the Americans. This underlies the call for controlling, even eliminating, immigration. As a bugaboo, there is nothing easier to use than immigration. But identity politics is a loose cannon. It doesn’t have to center on immigration. It can concentrate on secession – in Scotland, in Catalonia, in Chiapas. The list is long.

What shall we conclude from all these currents and countercurrents? Brexit is important as a symptom but not as a cause of turmoil. Since the turmoil is part of a chaotic structural crisis in the modern world-system, it is impossible to anticipate the many ways in which this scenario may play out in the next few years. The short run is too volatile. We are not paying enough attention to the middle run, where the long-run successor world-system (or systems) will be decided, and where the decision remains dependent on what we do in the middle-run struggle.

원문은 여기입니다 : http://monthlyreview.org/2014/05/01/stagnation-and-financialization

Fred Magdoff라는 Vermont 대학의 교수님이 작성한 기사인데 수요부족에 의한 자본주의의 위기와 이에 대한 해결책으로서의 금융산업의 역사적인 역할을 검토한뒤 해결책을 제시하는 글입니다. 요즘은 이런 글을 보려면 Monthly Review 정도는 찾아봐야 나오는군요. 예전에는 아고라에도 수준 높은 글들이 많았는데 말이죠. 

Stagnation and Financialization: The Nature of the Contradiction 요약

현재까지의 세계 경제 시장 상황

- 마르크스에 의하면 시장이 독점적으로 흐를 수록, 경제는 침체(stagnation)하려는 경향이 강해진다. 

- 이런 상황에 이르면 경제는 자체적인 성장 동력에 의하기 보다는, 정부지출/전쟁/주요 기술 발전(자동차)과 같은 외부적인 요인에 의해 성장을 이룩하게 된다.

- 대공황 이우 60여년간 세계 자본주의는 위기 상황에 시달려 왔다. 경기가 때로는 좋고 때로는 나빴지만, 좋은 상황이 정상이 아니라 나쁜 상황이 정상이라고 봐야 한다. 

- 이와 같은 상황에서는 경기를 활성화 시키는 것을 둘째 치고, 경기를 유지하기 위해서만이라도 '버블'이 필요하다.

- 미국 입장에서 세계적인 규모의 낭비 및 주요기술 발전이 없는 상황에서 남은 유일한 방법은 FIRE(finance, insurance, and real estate)뿐이었다.

- 기업의 축적된 자본은 생산과는 관련이 없는 투기성 활동으로 흘러들어갔다. 

- 하지만 이와 같이 금융산업을 통해 경기를 부양하는 정책은 거품이 터질 위험이 발생하였고, 미국 정부는 몇 차례에 걸쳐서 거품이 시스템을 파괴하기 전에 시장에 개입하였다. 

- '거품'과 '폭락'의 사이클을 반복하면서 찾아오는 위기의 규모는 더욱더 커지고 범위는 넓어졌다. 

- 마침내 2007년이 폭락이후 이자율은 0에 가깝지만 은행들을 돈을 빌려주지 않는 유동성의 위기가 찾아왔고, 이런 상황에서는 예전과 같은 새로운 '거품'의 발생이 불가능하다. 

- 임금노동자의 입장에서 경기침체란 줄어든 일자리와 작아지거나 정체된 월급을 의미한다.

해결책

- 과거 자동차 산업 처럼 그 자체로 엄청난 고용효과를 창출 할 수 있는 기술적 진보가 필요하지만, 현재의 IT기술이 창출하는 고용효과는 미비한 편이다. 

- 국가적으로는 순수출 증대를 통해 경제를 부양시킬 수 있지만, 모든 국가들이 순수출을 늘일 수 없으므로, 시스템 차원의 해결책이 될 수 없다. 

- 좌파적인 해결책으로는 금융시스템의 개혁을 이야기하지만, 이것은 문제 원인의 해결이 아니다. 문제의 원인은 자본주의 자체에 내재한 자본축적 과정이다.

- 오늘날 가장 인기있는 해결책은 정부세입을 증가시켜 저소득층의 소득을 보전해주는 것이다.

- 피케티는 자본에 대한 과세야 말로 유일한 해결책이라고 제안한다.

- 어쩌면 보다 직접적인 해결책은 자본의 이윤 앞에 사람들의 기본적인 욕구와 환경과 같은 사회적 목표를 두는 것일 수도 있다. 

The contradiction between a growth rate that is too low for a "healthy" economy, while at the same time too high to maintain a sustainable relation to the planet, is not a contraction of our analysis but of capitalism itself