북한사태에 대한 임마뉴엘 월러스틴 교수의 논편입니다.

일단, 북핵사태와 관련된 주요 행위자로 러시아를 제외하고 있다는 점이 다소 흥미롭습니다.

그 다음으로.. 북한의 핵보유국화에 따라, 일본->남한->대만으로 핵이 확산되리라고 예측하고 있군요.

이번 사태로 동북아에서 미국의 패권은 약화되리라고 보고 있습니다.

제가 가장 재미있게 생각하는 부분은.. 중국과 한국이 동시에 북한 체제 전복이 아닌 연착륙을 바라고 있다는 점을 지적하고 있고, 이것이 양국에게는 다른 대안이 없다라고 말하고 있네요.

서프에서 보는 분석글과 크게 다르지는 않은것 같습니다. 아무튼.. 동북아에서의 미국 패권 약화는 기정 사실화 되어 가고 있네요.

"The North Korean Imbroglio: Who Gains?"

North Korea has joined the nuclear club, and everyone else claims they are upset. Are they really? There are five actors that really count in this affair: North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, and Japan. They have all in fact reacted quite differently.

North Korea is undoubtedly the most pleased of all. They set off a nuclear explosion for several obvious reasons. They are persuaded that having a weapon in hand eliminates the likelihood of a United States attack. And it probably does. They also wanted to be taken more seriously as a world actor. And despite appearances in the last few weeks, they have probably accomplished this too. They wanted to show not only the United States but everyone else, specifically including China, that there was nothing much they could do about North Korea's decision, and they seem to have done that. And underlying all this, their primary objective no doubt is the survival of the regime. And they have probably done as much as is within their power to ensure this. But of course they too are not all-powerful.

The general world analysis of the effect of their action is that it will ensure a spread of nuclear armament, first of all in the region. I agree. Within a very short time, I expect Japan to start its program. It will be followed by South Korea. And then - no one mentions this - it will be followed by Taiwan, thus realizing a totally nuclearized Northeast Asia. Is this good or bad? The answer depends on whose perspective you take.

The United States is surely the most unhappy. In a period when U.S. effective power is declining everywhere, the last zone where it still seemed to have a strong edge has been Northeast Asia. No more. The Bush regime hasn't known what to do. It pushed for a rapid punishment of North Korea by the U.N. Security Council. What it came up with was a limp rag - a resolution that, albeit unanimous, might have been written by the North Koreans. Had a Democratic administration agreed to such a resolution, the first person to denounce it for its weakness would have been John Bolton. But since Bolton is Bush's Ambassador to the United Nations, he has hailed the resolution as a great accomplishment. Unpersuaded by Bolton's rhetoric, Condoleezza Rice has made the rounds of Northeast Asia, saying that she can not impose on anyone how they will implement the limp rag. Still she "expects" that China and South Korea will live up to the obligations she presumes they have, which they have no intention of doing and have said so.

Japan claims that it is very unhappy, and shares the U.S. hardline position. Pardon me for being skeptical. Isn't Shinzo Abe the man who became prime minister by promising to make Japan into a "normal" nation? This is code language for changing the constitution, creating a full-fledged army and nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear explosion gives Abe the immediate justification, and he will take it. Indeed, U.S. neo-cons are publicly calling on him to take it. They do so because they believe it will strengthen the U.S. position in the region and make more likely military action against North Korea.

But a Japanese nuclear program may well have the opposite consequence. The one thing that has tied Japan most closely to the United States in the last fifty years has been Japan's dependence on the U.S. nuclear shield. Once Japan has its own nuclear weapons, it has the possibility of being more independent. And sooner or later, it will realize this possibility.

China is of course unhappy, and for many reasons. For one thing, North Korea's action exposes the limits of China's power, which seems as helpless as the United States in this situation. For another thing, nuclear proliferation is not in China's interests. It's not worried about North Korea. It's worried about Japan and, above all, Taiwan.

China and South Korea share the desperate desire to see the North Korean regime survive (no "regime change" in their program). They are both banking on the possibility that their various kinds of economic assistance will bring about a slow and mild liberalization of the regime - more of the Deng Xiaopeng than the Gorbachev variety. Whether this is realistic we shall have to see. But do they have any choice except to bank on it, and work for it?

South Korea is in the most difficult position of the five powers. It is the only country in which public opinion seems split down the middle - between the party in power which believes in "engagement" with North Korea and the opposition which wants to replicate the Japanese position of close alignment with the United States. This will undoubtedly be one of the major issues in next year's presidential elections.

by Immanuel Wallerstein

[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]

북한의 미사일 발사 이후에 바로 인도의 미사일 발사시험이 있었군요. 불공평한 국제정세라고 할까.. 미국의 전횡이라고 해야 하나.뭔가겉과 속이 다른 사람을 보는 것 같군요. 이런 것도 'Real Politik' 일까요?

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"Whom Has North Korea Provoked?"

On July 6, 2006, North Korea launched six short-range missiles and one long-range one that failed. Around the world, thunderous critics said that this was a "provocation." Since then, North Korea has exhibited extraordinary calm, while everyone else has engaged in hectic verbal action.

There is first of all the United States, whose reaction has been described by The New York Times as "Bush's Shift: Being Patient With Foes." Vice-President Cheney downplayed the North Korean threat, saying that North Korean technology was "rudimentary." President Bush said that the U.S. was using diplomacy. "You know, the problem with diplomacy, it takes a while to get something done."

The diplomacy has been conducted largely by Christopher Hill, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs. It has consisted of contacts with four nations in the so-called "six-party talks" - China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. Mr. Hill has been trying to get these countries to put pressure of various kinds on North Korea to cease missile tests and return to the six-party talks as well as to support a strong resolution in the U.N. Security Council, should North Korea not do so. On July 12, Mr. Hill said he was "discouraged" by the lack of response from North Korea. He did not add that he was probably also discouraged by the positions of China, South Korea, and Russia.

The only country which seemed really agitated by the North Korean missile tests was Japan. There, Shinzo Abe, who is battling within the governing party to become the next Prime Minister, and whose self-presentation is that of a tough Japanese nationalist, said Japan should consider whether a "preventive" attack on North Korea was compatible with the Japanese constitution. Japan formally asked the Security Council to impose sanctions.

Of course, North Korea denounced Abe and Japan, but not half so loudly and publicly as did the spokesman of the South Korean and Chinese governments. South Korea did urge North Korea to make "wise judgments" to avert disaster, which was rather mild language. But South Korea accused Tokyo of "arrogance and outrageous rhetoric that further intensifies the crisis on the Korean peninsula," which was less mild. Nor were the Chinese gentler with Abe and Japan. Abe, they said, was "pouring oil on the fire." They added: "This practice is extremely irresponsible and incomprehensible and it will only seriously disrupt international diplomatic efforts and accelerate tensions in north-east Asia." Russia seems to share this view.

So consequence number one of the North Korean missile test was a public exacerbation of the political quarrels of both China and South Korea with Japan, quarrels that have been increasing over the past few years. For the United States, it means it has to navigate between what have been its two major allies in East Asia - Japan and South Korea. As for a U.N. resolution, it is most unlikely anything close to the Japanese version will be adopted.

On the home front, George Bush is running into trouble with his own supporters. In the latest issue of The Weekly Standard, leading journal of the neo-conservatives, editor William Kristol was scathing about Bush. He quotes Bush as telling the North Koreans they have a "choice to make" - or else. Kristol says that Kim Jong-Il has in fact already made his choice, but "what price will [he] pay?" In effect, says Kristol, none. "What was 'unacceptable' to President Bush a week ago (a North Korean missile launch) has been accepted."

Kristol ends his editorial with the highest insult he has in his repertory. He calls Bush's current foreign policy "Clintonian." As a final flourish, Kristol says: "The real choice isn't Kim Jong-Il's. It's Presidents Bush's." The New York Times has a different take on what Bush has been doing: "Mr. Bush is discovering the limits of his own pre-emption doctrine - and the frustrations of its alternative."

Meanwhile, to very little public notice, India launched its own long-range missile test on July 9, only three days after the North Korean launches. For the first time, India now has a missile that can land in China. This missile test was not denounced by anyone as a provocation. Journalists have talked of it as "a strategic step to keep China in check."

So we have a geopolitical situation in which some countries are denounced for launching missile tests and others are not (not only India of course but, for example, the United States). But those who are denounced for launching missile tests hear the denunciations as hollow, since even the United States seems hesitant to threaten war with a country that has even "rudimentary" nuclear weapons. And very quietly the Israeli government has been toning down its previous pressures on the United States to do "something" about Iran.

The realities of geopolitical limitations on military bravura are painful to learn and harder still to accept. If politics, as they say, is the art of the possible, what is possible today?

by Immanuel Wallerstein

유럽의 텔코들이 'quad-play'에 뛰어들고 있는 현황에 대해서 전하는 기사입니다만, 아지까지도 시장의 반응은 확실치 않다고 합니다. 과연 이런식의 번들상품을 대부분의 사람들이 원하고 있는걸까요? 문제는 가격입니다.

세가지/네가지를 합쳐서 가격이 많이 저렴해진다면 고려하겠지만, 가격상의 장점이 없이는 쓰려고 하지 않겠죠.

KT의 경우 전화는 독점이고 인터넷도 50%이상의 시장점유율을 가지고 있는 상황에서 이런 서비스가 가능할리 없겠죠?

그런데도 IP-TV에는 열심이군요.. 뭔 전략인지...--;

JUNE 1, 2006