최근의 그루지아 사태에 대한 월러스틴 교수의 해설입니다. 간략하게 말하면, 그루지아가 사태를 잘못판단하고 '오바' 한것 아니냐는 시각인듯 합니다. 미국의 영향력이 전세계적으로 강화된것처럼 보이지만, 실제로 냉전시대의 '슈퍼파워'의 지위가 아니라, 많은 강대국중에 하나라는 것이구요.. 그런 상황에서 냉전시대때 처럼 일방적으로 미국의 의지를 그 영향범위 안의 국가들에게 강요하기가 더 어려워지고 있다는 의미입니다.
이번 그루지아 사태는 미국의 영향범위로 들어오려는 그루지아의 지배층의 결단이었지만, 지정학적으로 그루지아가 러시아의 영향권에서 벗어나기가 얼마나 어려운것인가를 일깨워주는 사례가 된것이죠.
만일 한국이 북한과의 긴장관계에서나 통일 후 주변 2국인 중국과 러시아의 관계를 고려하지 않고 미국의 정책에 일방적으로 추종했을때 어떤 상황이 발생할 수 있을지를 가늠해 볼 수있는 좋은 사례가 되지 않을까 합니다. 또 흔한 말이지만 평화가 정착되는 듯한 현 시점에서 국방을 강화해서 전쟁 억지력을 확보해야 하는 이유가 무엇인지도 알 수 있게 해주는 사례입니다.
"Geopolitical Chess: Background to a Mini-war in the Caucasus"
The world has been witness this month to a mini-war in the Caucasus,and the rhetoric has been passionate, if largely irrelevant.Geopolitics is a gigantic series of two-player chessgames, in which the players seek positional advantage. In these games,it is crucial to know the current rules that govern the moves. Knightsare not allowed to move diagonally.
From 1945 to 1989, the principal chess game was that between theUnited States and the Soviet Union. It was called the Cold War, and thebasic rules were called metaphorically"Yalta." The most important rule concerned a line that divided Europeinto two zones of influence. It was called by Winston Churchill the"Iron Curtain" and ran from Stettin toTrieste. The rule was that, no matter how much turmoil was instigatedin Europe by the pawns, there was to be no actual warfare between theUnited States and the Soviet Union.And at the end of each instance of turmoil, the pieces were to bereturned to where they were at the outset. This rule was observedmeticulously right up to the collapse of theCommunisms in 1989, which was most notably marked by the destruction ofthe Berlin wall.
It is perfectly true, as everyone observed at the time, that theYalta rules were abrogated in 1989 and that the game between the UnitedStates and (as of 1991) Russia had changedradically. The major problem since then is that the United Statesmisunderstood the new rules of the game. It proclaimed itself, and wasproclaimed by many others, the lonesuperpower. In terms of chess rules, this was interpreted to mean thatthe United States was free to move about the chessboard as it saw fit,and in particular to transfer formerSoviet pawns to its sphere of influence. Under Clinton, and even morespectacularly under George W. Bush, the United States proceeded to playthe game this way.
There was only one problem with this: The United States was not thelone superpower; it was no longer even a superpower at all. The end ofthe Cold War meant that the UnitedStates had been demoted from being one of two superpowers to being onestrong state in a truly multilateral distribution of real power in theinterstate system. Many large countrieswere now able to play their own chess games without clearing theirmoves with one of the two erstwhile superpowers. And they began to doso.
Two major geopolitical decisions were made in the Clinton years.First, the United States pushed hard, and more or less successfully,for the incorporation of erstwhile Sovietsatellites into NATO membership. These countries were themselvesanxious to join, even though the key western European countries -Germany and France - were somewhatreluctant to go down this path. They saw the U.S. maneuver as one aimedin part at them, seeking to limit their newly-acquired freedom ofgeopolitical action.
The second key U.S. decision was to become an active player in theboundary realignments within the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.This culminated in a decision tosanction, and enforce with their troops, the de facto secession ofKosovo from Serbia.
Russia, even under Yeltsin, was quite unhappy about both these U.S.actions. However, the political and economic disarray of Russia duringthe Yeltsin years was such that the mostit could do was complain, somewhat feebly it should be added.
The coming to power of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin was more orless simultaneous. Bush decided to push the lone superpower tactics(the United States can move itspieces as it alone decides) much further than had Clinton. First, Bushin 2001 withdrew from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty. Then he announced that the UnitedStates would not move to ratify two new treaties signed in the Clintonyears: the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the agreed changes inthe SALT II nuclear disarmamenttreaty. Then Bush announced that the United States would move forwardwith its National Missile Defense system.
And of course, Bush invaded Iraq in 2003. As part of thisengagement, the United States sought and obtained rights to militarybases and overflight rights in the Central Asianrepublics that formerly were part of the Soviet Union. In addition, theUnited States promoted the construction of pipelines for Central Asianand Caucasian oil and natural gas thatwould bypass Russia. And finally, the United States entered into anagreement with Poland and the Czech Republic to establish missiledefense sites, ostensibly to guard againstIranian missiles. Russia, however, regarded them as aimed at her.
Putin decided to push back much more effectually than Yeltsin. As aprudent player, however, he moved first to strengthen his home base -restoring effective central authority andreinvigorating the Russian military. At this point, the tides in theworld-economy changed, and Russia suddenly became a wealthy andpowerful controller not only of oil productionbut of the natural gas so needed by western European countries.
Putin thereupon began to act. He entered into treaty relationshipswith China. He maintained close relations with Iran. He began to pushthe United States out of its Central Asianbases. And he took a very firm stand on the further extension of NATOto two key zones - Ukraine and Georgia.
The breakup of the Soviet Union had led to ethnic secessionistmovements in many former republics, including Georgia. When Georgia in1990 sought to end the autonomous statusof its non-Georgian ethnic zones, they promptly proclaimed themselvesindependent states. They were recognized by no one but Russiaguaranteed their de facto autonomy.
The immediate spurs to the current mini-war were twofold. InFebruary, Kosovo formally transformed its de facto autonomy to de jureindependence. Its move was supported by andrecognized by the United States and many western European countries.Russia warned at the time that the logic of this move applied equallyto the de facto secessions in the formerSoviet republics. In Georgia, Russia moved immediately, for the firsttime, to recognize South Ossetian de jure independence in directresponse to that of Kosovo.
And in April this year, the United States proposed at the NATOmeeting that Georgia and Ukraine be welcomed into a so-calledMembership Action Plan. Germany, France, and theUnited Kingdom all opposed this action, saying it would provoke Russia.
Georgia's neoliberal and strongly pro-American president, MikhailSaakashvili, was now desperate. He saw the reassertion of Georgianauthority in South Ossetia (and Abkhazia)receding forever. So, he chose a moment of Russian inattention (Putinat the Olympics, Medvedev on vacation) to invade South Ossetia. Ofcourse, the puny South Ossetian militarycollapsed completely. Saakashvili expected that he would be forcing thehand of the United States (and indeed of Germany and France as well).
Instead, he got an immediate Russian military response, overwhelmingthe small Georgian army. What he got from George W. Bush was rhetoric.What, after all, could Bush do?The United States was not a superpower. Its armed forces were tied downin two losing wars in the Middle East. And, most important of all, theUnited States needed Russia farmore than Russia needed the United States. Russia's foreign minister,Sergei Lavrov, pointedly noted in an op-ed in the Financial Times that Russia was a "partner with the weston...the Middle East, Iran and North Korea."
As for western Europe, Russia essentially controls its gas supplies.It is no accident that it was President Sarkozy of France, notCondoleezza Rice, who negotiated the truce betweenGeorgia and Russia. The truce contained two essential concessions byGeorgia. Georgia committed itself to no further use of force in SouthOssetia, and the agreement contained noreference to Georgian territorial integrity.
So, Russia emerged far stronger than before. Saakashvili had beteverything he has and was now geopolitically bankrupt. And, as anironic footnote, Georgia, one of the last U.S.allies in the coalition in Iraq, withdrew all its 2000 troops fromIraq. These troops had been playing a crucial role in Shi'a areas, andwould now have to be replaced by U.S. troops,which will have to be withdrawn from other areas.
If one plays geopolitical chess, it is best to know the rules, or one gets out-maneuvered.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
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